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Executive Summary 
 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 revealed national security vulnerabilities that had previously 
not received high level priority in the United States, such as insecure transportation and 
infrastructure networks. In response, airport security—including passenger and baggage 
scanning—has been improved. Yet seaport security policies have been slow to change. Five 
years after 9/11, only 5% of the six million cargo containers that arrive at U.S. seaports are 
scanned for threats.  
 
The importance of port and cargo container security has prompted Congressional attention. 
However, legislative attempts to mandate 100% scanning of cargo containers bound for the U.S. 
have thus far failed, such as Representative Edward Markey’s (D-MA) proposed amendment to 
the SAFE Port Act.  
 
This study identified and analyzed five major barriers to 100% cargo container scanning:  
ambiguity in 100% cargo scanning policies, technology limitations, cost, logistical difficulties, 
and stakeholder support.  We presented recommendations that can overcome each of the 
identified barriers. Finally, we evaluated possible channels that can be used to achieve a 
successful 100% cargo container scanning program. 
Ambiguity in 100% Cargo Scanning Policies 
Policy makers have exploited the vagueness of certain 100% cargo container scanning policies in 
order to debate their usefulness and feasibility, preventing the adoption of any 100% cargo 
scanning policy to date. Before any discussion of a 100% cargo container scanning policy can 
take place, the associated terminology must be clearly defined.  
 
After policy makers agree on terminology, there still exists a danger that the overall goals and 
objectives of the policy remain poorly defined. Cargo scanning policies may be designed for 
detection, deterrence, or resiliency.   
Technology Limitations 
Opponents of 100% cargo scanning have argued that scanning technologies are too immature to 
be scaled up to 100% levels. While this is true for chemical and biological detection, the Port of 
Hong Kong—the second largest port in the world—has successfully instituted a 100% scan of all 
cargo using imaging technology and radiation detection.  
 
This study evaluated the capabilities of currently available scanning technologies. We found that 
a basic scan of all cargo bound for U.S. seaports could be accomplished using imaging 
technology and passive radiation detection.  
Cost 
The economic implications of 100% cargo scanning extend not only to the cost of the technology 
and direct implementation (including labor and maintenance), but also to the indirect costs of 
delay in the supply chain.  Many cargo systems, specifically perishable goods and “just-in-time” 
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processes, are intolerable of long inspection processes and delays, making indirect costs 
significant.   
 
Evaluating the benefits of 100% cargo scanning is necessarily difficult because it requires 
comparing the costs of the policy with the benefit of preventing a terrorist attack. Studies have 
estimated that port attack costs can range from $1 billion to $1 trillion. Benefits associated with 
preventing an attack are difficult to quantify, and thus any economic justification of 100% cargo 
scanning policies is challenging.      
Logistical Difficulties 
Four logistical questions must be answered to design a successful 100% cargo container 
scanning program. These questions are: Where in the supply chain should cargo be scanned? 
How should cargo containers be scanned? When should scan data be viewed? How should risk 
analysis be incorporated? 
 
The primary considerations are: extending protective borders around the U.S., trustworthiness of 
scans and resource restrictions.  To extend borders, scans can be conducted at foreign sites. To 
ensure trustworthiness of scans, the operations can be overseen by U.S. officials.   
 
Resource restrictions are the limiting factor to implementing a 100% scanning program.  If 100% 
of cargo containers are scanned and viewed, 5% will be flagged for physical inspection due to 
the false positive rate of current technology. This would require a 20-fold increase of land and 
labor requirements at ports. This can be mitigated by using risk analysis to limit the fraction of 
scan data viewed, thereby maintaining current physical inspection rates.  
Stakeholder Support 
Successfully implementing a 100% cargo scan policy requires the support of all parties who have 
a stake in the policy. This study expresses the primary stakeholders as: the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. legislators, foreign governments, retailers/manufacturers, port 
authorities, terminal operators/ocean carriers, longshoremen, and ground transportation firms. 
 
Six key issues are used to express the interaction between these many stakeholders: port 
throughput, supply chain security, regional security, cost of program, jobs creation and worker 
safety. During the course of this discussion the primary tradeoffs that influence stakeholder 
decisions are identified, including balances of equity, efficiency, security, liberty and privacy.   
Channels and Resources 
The committee also evaluated three channels that can be used to achieve 100% cargo container 
scanning: business as usual, market education/incentives, and legislative mandate.  
 
Business as usual implies allowing DHS at its discretion to increase cargo scanning programs 
overseen by Customs and Border Protection, which may eventually result in 100% cargo 
container scanning. However, there is no guarantee that current trends will continue until 100% 
scanning is achieved. Employing market incentives to encourage cargo container scanning may 
appease some of the current industry opponents but is no more reliable than business as usual. 
Legislating 100% cargo scanning is a more certain and direct method of achieving a successful 
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policy and would be most desirable in terms of stability. Still, the legislative channel is a 
contentious one, as evidenced by the recent defeat of the Markey amendment.  
 
Recommendations 
This report presents six recommendations to overcoming the barriers to success of 100% 
maritime cargo container scanning: 
 
1. Study the effect of 100% scanning as a deterrent to terrorist attacks.   
 
2.  100% scanning should be conducted at foreign ports.  
 
a. Scanning at foreign ports should be overseen by U.S. officials who monitor 
compliance with U.S. scanning standards.   
 
b. Promote development of anti-tamper devices.   
 
c. Containers that are not scanned at foreign ports should not be loaded on ships.   
 
3. Couple radiation detection with imaging for 100% scanning.  Focus R&D on reducing 
false positive rates and improving chemical detection technology.  
 
4. Coordinate stakeholders with strong executive backing and propose unambiguous 
legislation to Congress stipulating 100% scanning.  
 
5. View and interpret only 5% of stored scans based on 100% risk screening.  
 
6. Emphasize resiliency as the primary goal of 100% scanning.  
 
.  
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I. Introduction and Scope of Report 
 
This study investigated the barriers that impede the adoption and successful operation of a 
program that scans every maritime cargo container entering the United States for weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD).  Whereas previous studies on the topic of 100% cargo container 
scanning have assessed the need for 100% scanning and the feasibility of specific program 
elements, our analysis identified the controlling factors that have prevented any 100% cargo 
container policy from being adopted to date.  
 
Instead of evaluating the performance of hypothetical variations of 100% cargo scanning 
programs in terms of their ability to detect WMD or prevent a terrorist attack, our study 
addressed two basic questions,  
 
1. What are the barriers to the successful adoption of a 100% maritime cargo container 
scanning policy? 
2. What are the barriers to the successful implementation of such a policy? 
   
To answer these questions, our study assessed technology enablers, labor and resource 
requirements, program cost, economic impact, stakeholder interests, and possible channels that 
can be utilized to achieve 100% cargo scanning.  Furthermore, the study addresses important 
aspects of maritime and port security that must be considered in order to ensure that a 100% 
scanning program is not undermined by security lapses elsewhere in the supply line.   
 
After identifying and characterizing the barriers to the success of 100% maritime cargo container 
scanning, our report presents recommendations to overcome the biggest hurdles. 
Methodology 
We first analyzed the major elements of cargo container security by following the flow of U.S. 
bound cargo along the supply chain. Specifically, from: 
  
1. Upstream suppliers in foreign countries to foreign ports, then from  
2. Foreign ports to domestic ports, and then from 
3. Domestic ports to U.S. manufacturers and retailers 
 
At each link in the supply chain we identified security risks and evaluated whether or not a 100% 
container scanner program could be implemented by reviewing government and non-
governmental reports, in addition to congressional testimony.  A feasibility study of the 100% 
container scanning pilot program at the Port of Hong Kong was performed.  A cost-benefit 
analysis was also reviewed. 
 
To facilitate our understanding of the global supply chain, container security, and the current 
state of 100% container scanning policy, we conducted expert interviews to augment literature 
review.  
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II. Background and Overview 
 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 revealed national security vulnerabilities that had previously 
not received high level priority in the United States, such as insecure transportation and 
infrastructure networks. In response, airport security—including passenger and baggage 
scanning—has been improved. Yet seaport security policies have been slow to change. Five 
years after 9/11, only 5% of the 6 million cargo containers that arrive at U.S. seaports are 
scanned for threats.1  
 
While all cargo containers entering the U.S. are screened for security risk, currently only about 
one in twenty are physically scanned with technology that can detect WMD.  Of this small 
fraction, only 5% then undergo secondary scans by means of physical inspection.2 Cargo 
containers therefore might be attractive vessels for smuggling conventional, chemical, biological, 
or nuclear weapons into the United States.   
 
To address this perceived security threat, some politicians and security experts have proposed 
requiring that all cargo containers entering domestic ports be scanned for WMD.  Yet no 100% 
cargo container scanning policy has been adopted.  In fact, the U.S. is not much closer to 100% 
container scanning than it was on September 11, 2001.  
 
We begin our investigation of barriers to the success of 100% container scanning with an 
overview of the global supply chain.  The following sections identify the nuts and bolts of the 
supply chain: how cargo is transported, who transports it, and who keeps it secure.  
Intermodal Containers 
Standardized intermodal cargo containers are able to be transported by truck, train, plane, and 
ship.  They are the familiar steel boxes seen on the beds of tractor-trailers and freight rail cars. 
Approximately 90 percent of the world’s non-bulk cargo is transported in standard intermodal 
containers.3  Over 6 million of these cargo containers (physical containers, not TEUs) pass 
through U.S. ports of entry each year.4   
                                                 
1 Susan E. Martonosi, D. S. O., Henry H. Willis, (2005). Evaluating the viability of 100 per cent container inspection 
at America's ports, RAND. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Stana, R. M. (2004). 'Homeland security: Summary of challenges faced in targeting oceangoing cargo containers 
for inspection,' Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, House of Representatives. Washington, D.C., GAO. 
4 Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2002). Maritime Trade and Transportation, Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics. 
BARRIERS TO THE SUCCESS OF 100% MARITIME CARGO CONTAINER SCANNING 
 9
 
Figure 1:  Standard intermodal cargo container, Twenty foot equivalent unit5 
 
Cargo containers come in five standard lengths: 20-ft, 40-ft, 45-ft, 48-ft, and 53-ft.  In the United 
States, standard containers are generally 48-ft and 53-ft (rail and truck). Container capacity is 
measured in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU). A twenty-foot equivalent unit is a measure of 
containerized cargo capacity equal to one standard 20-ft (length) × 8-ft (width) × 8.5-ft (height) 
container (Figure 1).6 
Port Operations7 
Most major container ports are publicly owned by a “port authority,” which is part of a 
municipal or state government. The port authority is responsible for the administration of all 
properties and facilities at the port, including the numerous marine terminals that serve as 
assigned areas for loading and unloading ships.  
 
Typically, a public port authority leases the operation of marine terminals to a private company. 
This ownership scheme is analogous to a shopping mall, where the entire property complex is 
owned by a single firm which then leases the operation of individual stores to retail businesses.  
 
While public port ownership and private terminal operation is the norm, not all ports are 
arranged this way. For example, public port authorities do not own many of the marine terminals 
associated with the oil, gas, and chemical industries. At the Port of Houston, for instance, the 
Port of Houston Authority only owns twelve terminals, while the remaining 138 terminals are 
owned by domestic, foreign, or multi-national companies. Still, the most important terminals to 
consider with regard to this report are container terminals, which are predominantly publicly 
owned and privately leased.  
 
                                                 
5  “Retailers applaud rejection of Markey amendment to ‘Safe Ports Act,’ News release, Retailers Industry Leaders 
Association, April 2006 
6 Containerization, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cargo_container 
7 Much of this information in this section on port operations is taken from John Fritelli, J. E. L. (2006). Terminal 
operators and their role in U.S. port and maritime security. Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service. 
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Today, most U.S. container terminals are leased to foreign terminal operators. In fact, as 
globalization has transformed the shipping industry, foreign involvement in U.S. ports and U.S. 
supply lines has increased. This issue recently achieved national attention during the much-
publicized attempt by Dubai Ports World to operate marine terminals in the U.S.  
 
Once a ship has arrived at a terminal for loading or unloading, cargo is handled by workers from 
a longshoremen union, which negotiate contracts through a trade association that represents 
terminal operators.   
 
Customs and Border
Protection (Cargo)
Coast Guard (Ships)
Varies 
Security:
Longshoremen UnionContainer loading:
Operate ships, may be 
same as terminal 
operators
Ocean carriers:
Usually leased to 
private companies
Terminal operations:
Port Authority (Public or 
Private)
Ownership:
US
Foreign
 
Figure 2: Port operations overview 
   
Security Procedures 
Domestic maritime and port security is primarily overseen by two federal entities: the U.S. Coast 
Guard and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a division of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).  The Coast Guard is responsible for the security of port facilities and 
vessels, while CBP ensures cargo security. Additionally, the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA, also a part of DHS) works with the Coast Guard to screen port workers.  
Coast Guard Requirements for Port Facility and Vessel Security8 
The Coast Guard establishes performance-based security requirements that all terminal operators 
must meet. Each terminal operator is required to conduct a security assessment of their facility, 
write a security plan, and submit it to the Coast Guard for approval.  
 
A terminal facility security plan must specify the means that terminal operators employ to 
oversee security of the facility grounds. This includes the use of fences to restrict access to the 
facility, a method of identifying unauthorized personnel, and the deployment of security guards, 
                                                 
8 All of this information on Coast Guard Requirements is taken from John Fritelli, J. E. L. (2006). Terminal 
operators and their role in U.S. port and maritime security. Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service. 
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water-borne patrols, alarm systems, surveillance equipment, and lighting. Security plans that 
apply to container terminals must also specify how the integrity of container seals will be 
checked and how arriving trucks will be checked for legitimate business at the facility.  
 
Coast Guard requirements for vessel owners are similar to the requirements for terminal 
operators, including a security plan that must be submitted to the Coast Guard for approval.  
 
The Coast Guard requires that ships entering or leaving U.S. ports give the Coast Guard a 96-
hour notice of arrival (NOA). The NOA includes information about the ship, crew, and cargo.   
CBP Initiatives for Cargo Security9   
Customs and Border Protection oversees cargo container security.10 Under this authority, CBP 
manages a program related to supply chain security, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT), and a program directed at cargo screening and scanning, the Container 
Security Initiative (CSI). 
C-TPAT 
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism is a voluntary program that grants members 
expedited cargo processing if they submit to and meet CBP review of their supply chain security 
procedures.  In practical terms, importers that are members of C-TPAT receive various benefits 
that reduce the level of scrutiny applied to their cargo shipments. 
 
In order to become a member of C-TPAT, importers must conduct a self-assessment of their 
supply chain security, ensure that their security procedures extend to any other companies that 
are a part of their supply chain, and submit a security profile to CBP.  CBP then reviews an 
applicant’s submitted security profile and works with the company to address any gaps or 
weaknesses. Once all issues are resolved the application is certified and the applicant is 
considered a member of C-TPAT.  
 
While CBP originally planned to validate all members within three years, the agency had only 
validated 11% of its certified members in 2005, three years after the creation of the program.    
CSI 
The Container Security Initiative uses intelligence and risk analysis to identify and inspect high-
risk containers at foreign ports.  Through CSI, multidisciplinary teams of CBP inspectors are 
stationed at ports around the world to work with their foreign counterparts and establish criteria 
for identifying high-risk containers.  Whereas C-TPAT is a partnership between CBP and 
importers, CSI is a partnership between CBP and international ports.  
 
U.S. law requires that maritime shippers submit electronic cargo manifests to CBP’s Automated 
Manifest System 24 hours before the cargo is loaded on a ship at a foreign port.  The information 
                                                 
9 All of this information on CBP initiatives for cargo security, unless otherwise cited, is taken from two GAO 
documents: (1) Stana, R. M. (2005). 'Homeland security: Key cargo security programs can be improved,' testimony 
before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, United States Senate. Washington, D.C., and (2) ‘Container Security: A flexible staffing model and 
minimum equipment requirements would improve overseas targeting and inspection efforts,’ GAO, April 2005.   
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in the cargo manifest is then processed by CBP’s Automated Targeting System (ATS), which 
helps CBP agents determine the risk individual cargo containers pose.  CBP agents stationed at 
CSI ports use ATS in conjunction with foreign intelligence and host government officials to 
determine which containers should be scanned and/or inspected.  
 
Because host governments are sovereign, they may accept or reject CSI decisions about which 
cargo containers to scan. If a host government refuses to scan or inspect a cargo container that a 
CSI team targets, the container will be scanned once it reaches its destination U.S. port.  
 
The General Accountability Office (GAO) has identified several weaknesses in the CSI program 
when he testified before the Senate in 2005.  Included in that list were (1) staffing imbalances 
that prevented 35% of inbound shipments from being targeted overseas; (2) operational 
limitations that prevented 28% of containers referred for inspection from being inspected; (3) no 
minimum technical requirements for scanning and inspection equipment used as part of CSI; and 
(4) no means of verifying the accuracy of manifest data.       
 
As of June 2006, CSI was operational in 44 ports, accounting for approximately 75% of all cargo 
containers headed for the U.S.11  
TSA Screening of Port Workers 
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 requires that a biometric identification be 
issued to all port workers after they have undergone a background check and have been deemed 
not to pose a terrorism risk. The Coast Guard is working with TSA to develop the card, known as 
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC).  
 
Currently, most U.S. port authorities have no worker identification cards. Exceptions include the 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which began registering and licensing 
longshoremen during the 1950’s to combat corruption on the docks, and several ports in Florida, 
where a state-wide port worker ID system is being implemented to satisfy a new Florida law.12  
Current Cargo Security Procedures 
Electronic manifests of all U.S.-bound maritime cargo container data arrive at Customs and 
Border Protection’s Automated Manifest System 24 hours before the containers are loaded onto 
ships at foreign ports.  The manifests contain information about the contents of containers, their 
ownership, origin, and destination.  CBP then applies its Automated Targeting System (ATS) to 
risk screen the data and target risky containers for scanning.  Currently about 5% of containers 
are deemed risky enough to warrant a primary scan.  
 
Several problems have been identified in this initial phase of cargo container security.  First, 
CBP has no means of guaranteeing manifest authenticity.  Second, ship manifests are often an 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Customs and Border Protection was created in the reorganization that resulting in the creation of the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS CBP is comprised of the functions of the former U.S. Customs Service, Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Border Patrol, and part of the Animal and Plant Inspection Service. 
11 CBP (2006). 'Container security initiative coming to Jamaica,' News release. 
12 John Fritelli, J. E. L. (2006). Terminal operators and their role in U.S. port and maritime security. Washington, 
D.C., Congressional Research Service. 
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inaccurate record of cargo contents, even when they are authentic. Additionally, the effectiveness 
of the risk assessment algorithm used by CBP has been questioned by GAO.  According to GAO, 
ATS not been proven to be any better than selecting containers at random.13 
 
Ship
Manifest
Risk
Screen Risky?
Primary 
Scan Anomaly?
Physical
Inspection
Container
Released
Container
Released
Container
ReleasedWMD?
Container
Stopped
No  (95%)
No  (95%)
No
Yes (5%)
Yes (5%)
Yes
Poor risk screening      
+ Low scanning rates 
Ineffective Security Procedure
Action Required: 100% Scanning
 
Figure 3: Current cargo security procedure 
 
The 95% of cargo that is not targeted for primary scanning is released and loaded onto ships.  Of 
the 5% that is scanned, about 5% reveal an anomaly after viewing the scan data (either an x-ray 
type image or radiation emission signature).  Scanned containers that reveal anomalies are 
moved to an inspection area and are physically inspected.14  
 
The 0.25% of containers that are physically examined (5% of 5% = 0.25%) require significant 
port resources.  On average, it takes approximately 15-20 CBP officials four hours to unload the 
contents of the container, match them to the manifest, and investigate the anomaly. Physical 
examination also requires space for inspection areas, a serious concern in ports where land is a 
premium.15  
Case Study: Port of Hong Kong 
The port of Hong Kong ranks second in the world based on cargo volume, handling 22.6 million 
TEUs in 2005.  In comparison, the port of Long Beach only handled 7.485 million TEUs that 
                                                 
13 Stana, R. M. (2005). 'Homeland security: Key cargo security programs can be improved,' testimony before the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United 
States Senate. Washington, D.C. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Susan E. Martonosi, D. S. O., Henry H. Willis, (2005). Evaluating the viability of 100 per cent container 
inspection at America's ports, RAND. 
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same year.16 The port of Hong Kong is a major hub port in the global supply chain serving over 
500 destinations worldwide and accessing 80 international shipping lanes.17   
 
 
Figure 4: Map of Port of Hong Kong18 
 
 
Hong Kong implemented a 100% cargo container scanning process as part of a pilot program 
sponsored by terminal operators and ocean carriers in 2004.19 As trucks enter the port, they are 
forced to slow down by executing a 180-degree turn, after which they drive through two 
consecutive scanners at low speeds.  The first scanner is a radiation portal and the second is an 
imaging scanner.  All scan data is electronically stored along with an image of the container ID.  
The amortized cost is estimated to be $6.50 per container.20 
 
In danger of project termination, the Hong Kong port authority asked for U.S. recognition and 
financial support of the program in 2005.  While the U.S. conceded that the implementation of 
the scanning has the potential to minimize impacts to the world economy in the event of a 
security breach, officials did not indicate that the technology would be used in the U.S., and did 
not provide any funding.21 Ultimately, the 100% cargo scanning pilot program was shut down.22 
                                                 
16 “Summary of Statistics on Port Traffic of Hong Kong,” Port, Maritime and Logistics Development Unit, 
Economic Development and Labour Bureau, July 2006; www.pdc.gov.hk/eng/statistics/docs/Jul2006.pdf  
17 Hong Kong Port Development Council (2006).  Summary of Statistics on Port Traffic of Hong Kong, July 2006.  
Available at   http://www.pdc.gov.hk/eng/home/index.htm  
18 Hong Kong Port Development Council (2006).  Summary of Statistics on Port Traffic of Hong Kong, July 2006.  
Available at   http://www.pdc.gov.hk/eng/home/index.htm  
19 “The Future of Cargo Security—Port of Hong Kong Implements new screening Technology,” SCDigest, August 
4, 2005; www.scdigest.com/assets/NewsViews/05-08-04.cfm 
20 Ibid. 
21  “The Future of Cargo Security—Port of Hong Kong Implements new screening Technology,” SCDigest, August 
4, 2005; www.scdigest.com/assets/NewsViews/05-08-04.cfm 
22 Interview with Steve Flynn, November 27, 2006 
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III. The Five Barriers To 100% Cargo Scanning 
 
This section identifies and analyzes the five major barriers to 100% cargo container scanning:  
ambiguity in 100% cargo scanning policies, technology limitations, cost, logistical difficulties, 
and stakeholder support.  
1. Ambiguity in 100% Cargo Scanning Policies 
 
Although ambiguity facilitates compromise and flexible interpretation, it also provides a 
potential foundation to rally opposition.  Stakeholders that disagree on interpretation due to 
ambiguity within the proposed policy, collectively agree on opposing the policy.  
Terminology 
In the past, bills involving 100% cargo scanning have fallen victim to criticism that they are too 
vague. Does “scanning” mean having a dog smell the container? Does “scanning” require 
imaging or radiation detection? Does “100% cargo scanning” apply to containers leaving the 
U.S.? These and other questions become particularly important because 100% cargo scanning 
has been referenced in many different situations and meant drastically different things.  
 
Terms related to cargo scanning can be interpreted in many different ways.  The SAFE Port Act 
of 2006 attempted to clarify the definitions of commonly used terminology.  
 
(9) INSPECTION—The term ‘‘inspection’’ means the comprehensive process used by the United 
States Customs and Border Protection to assess goods entering the United States to appraise them 
for duty purposes, to detect the presence of restricted or prohibited items, and to ensure 
compliance with all applicable laws. The process may include screening, conducting an 
examination, or conducting a search. 
 
(13) SCREENING—The term ‘‘screening’’ means a visual or automated review of information 
about goods, including manifest or entry documentation accompanying a shipment being 
imported into the United States, to determine the presence of misdeclared, restricted, or 
prohibited items and assess the level of threat posed by such cargo. 
 
(12) SCAN—The term ‘‘scan’’ means utilizing nonintrusive imaging equipment, radiation 
detection equipment, or both, to capture data, including images of a container. 
 
(8) EXAMINATION—The term ‘‘examination’’ means an inspection of cargo to detect the 
presence of misdeclared, restricted, or prohibited items that utilizes nonintrusive imaging and 
detection technology. 
 
(14) SEARCH—The term ‘‘search’’ means an intrusive examination in which a container is 
opened and its contents are devanned and visually inspected for the presence of misdeclared, 
restricted, or prohibited items.23 
 
                                                 
23 SAFE Port Act, Sec 2: Government Printing Office, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h4954enr.txt.pdf 
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To minimize ambiguity and individual interpretation, cargo scan policy terminology requires 
explicit definition.  Communication and understanding of the terminology is also critical to 
prevent ambiguity from becoming a barrier rather than a tool.  
 
As can be seen above, the definition of scanning from the Safe Port Act requires imaging or 
radiation but not both.  By this definition, a 100% scanning policy could involve only one 
technology and remain true to its name.  In this case, the definition of scanning makes the 100% 
scanning title confusing, because most experts would not consider that to comprise a 
comprehensive security scan.  
Goals and Objectives 
Policy makers have not been clear about the goals of proposed 100% cargo container scanning 
programs. Traditionally, cargo scanning policies are thought to have two major purposes: 
detection and deterrence. When deciding on the details of the policy, distinguishing between 
detection and deterrence can affect resource designation and design of process implementation.   
 
In “The Resilient Enterprise,” Yossi Sheffi asserts that to “reduce a company’s vulnerability to 
disruption, executives need to look at increasing both security and resilience.”24  Policymakers 
must therefore also recognize resiliency as a goal of a 100% cargo scanning policy.   
Resiliency as a Goal 
A 100% cargo container scanning policy builds resiliency into the supply chain by providing a 
forensic tool to identify the source of an attack if one occurs.  For example, if WMD were 
detonated in a cargo container at a U.S. port, security officials could review stored images and 
identify which cargo container was used to smuggle the device. Once the container was 
identified, its origin and ownership could be investigated.  Moreover, investigators could review 
images of all other cargo containers that recently arrived in domestic ports, or were on ships 
bound for the U.S.     
 
The hope is that being able to identify the supply chain vulnerability would enable port 
operations to resume in days, rather than weeks—as government overreaction might tend to do. 
This function is similar the “black box” recorder that permits accident investigators to rebuild the 
final sequence of events just before an airplane crash.  
2. Technology Limitations 
 
In response to the failure of the Markey amendment to the SAFE ports Act of 2006 the Retail 
Industry Leaders Association said:  
 
…efforts to amend the SAFE Ports Act that would have required adoption of unproved 
technologies and untested procedures in the cargo container screening process. This 
amendment would have essentially mandated the use of technologies whose time has not 
                                                 
24 Sheffi, Yossi. The Resilient Enterprise: Overcoming Vulnerability for Competitive Advantage, MIT Press, 
Cambridge MA, 2005 pg. 14 
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yet come, and forced the implementation of systems that contain a host of unresolved 
operational issues.25 
 
Clearly, 100% cargo scanning imposes a heavy requirement on technology. Armed with this 
realization, opponents of 100% cargo scanning policies have often argued that scanning 
technologies are not advanced enough to be effective at current container volumes, both 
domestically and abroad.  
 
To address this technology barrier this study evaluated available technologies with the need for 
high flow rates and non-intrusive inspections (NII) – scanning technologies that can effectively 
scan the cargo without ever needing to open the container. Non-intrusive technologies enable 
efficient cargo scanning with minimal delays, in contrast to handheld scanning devices 
associated with manual inspections.  As all non-intrusive technologies need minimal human 
labor, it is assumed that all technologies mentioned herein have roughly the same labor 
requirement: one to three operators per piece of scanning equipment.26   
Radiological Imaging 
Imaging technologies utilize electromagnetic radiation to non-invasively provide a picture of 
container contents.  Images are typically created by subjecting containers to either gamma-rays 
or x-rays and measuring transmission of the rays through cargo.  Electromagnetic waves are 
directed towards the cargo from one direction, while sensors detect the transmission on the other 
side of cargo.  Electromagnetic radiation is blocked by denser cargo, while less dense cargo 
allows for transmission; thus this type of scanning is frequently called ‘density scanning’ or 
‘density imaging’.  This method of transmission imaging is particularly designed to detect high 
atomic number elements (i.e. metals). 
 
Unfortunately, imaging does not detect threats, it provides shapes.  It provides a picture of the 
cargo, which then must be interpreted to determine whether the image appears dangerous or not.  
This process involves comparing the picture to the manifest to see whether the two match.  
Irregular or unexpected objects would warrant further scanning and inspection to determine 
whether the object is dangerous. Implied in this process is the need for image interpretation, 
which is typically performed by humans. Humans are susceptible to fatigue, and general human 
fallibility, yet human interpretation is still considered the industry norm. This use of human 
interpretation is viewed by some as a major problem with imaging technologies, and although 
image interpretation software is in development it is unlikely that the software will be flawless 
either.  
 
Consideration must also be made for the humans who will be operating the imaging technologies 
as electromagnetic radiation exposure is harmful to humans. This can lead to significant 
opposition to the institution of greater amounts of scanning by the workers who are concerned 
with their health. To avoid significant exposure, it may be necessary to remove any human 
                                                 
25 “Retailers applaud rejection of Markey amendment to ‘Safe Ports Act,’ News release, Retailers Industry Leaders 
Association, April 2006 
26 Susan E. Martonosi, D. S. O., Henry H. Willis, (2005). Evaluating the viability of 100 per cent container 
inspection at America's ports, RAND 
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operators from a predetermined exclusion zone around the container.  This could significantly 
increase the land required for scanning lanes.  
 
While there the above issues with imaging are important it is equally important to note that 
imaging technologies are mature and current R&D is refining the emission and detection process 
to allow for higher resolution and penetration with less exposure.  Below is a discussion of the 
two primary types of imaging technology.  
Gamma-ray  
Gamma-rays are released via a shutter from a radioactive material to image cargo, typically 
either cobalt-60 or cesium-137. Scintillation detectors then identify gamma-rays that have 
penetrated through the cargo.  Gamma-rays can typically penetrate six inches of steel.27  The 
resolution of the gamma-ray images is sufficient to confirm empty containers, show the general 
shape of cargo, and identify anomalies in lightly-loaded containers.   
 
Gamma-ray imaging systems allow for high throughput of containers.  The two largest 
manufacturers of gamma-ray scanners claim that their portals can scan 120 trucks / hr.28  Another 
study indicates that scanning rates are 30 TEU per hour and that the limiting rate is the speed 
with which images are interpreted.29  Employing multiple interpreters for every operator could 
speed up throughput.  Gamma-ray scanners are simpler than x-ray systems and have a much 
lower cost of ownership.  Initial cost is typically $1 million with annual maintenance costs close 
to $90,000.30  Due to this high throughput and reasonable cost, gamma ray technology is 
currently in use at the Port of Hong Kong to accomplish 100% cargo scanning.  
 
A truck driver undergoing a scan would have an exposure equivalent to fifteen minutes of sea-
level background radiation and exposure levels for gamma-ray scanning is significantly less than 
x-ray scanning.31 This should allay concerns about exposure to gamma-rays.  
X-ray 
In comparison, x-rays are capable of penetrating roughly twelve inches of steel.32  The resolution 
of x-rays is much greater than that of gamma-rays and is able to give a much more detailed 
picture of a container, particularly when the container is heavily-loaded. 
 
Claims of throughput rates for x-rays scanning vary by manufacturer, but they are generally 
slower than gamma-ray imaging.  One study indicates twenty TEU per hour as a reasonable 
estimate.33  The limiting rate is again interpretation of x-ray images.  Because of the complex 
                                                 
27 SAIC(2006) www.saic.com; Rapiscan Systems (2006) www.rapiscansystems.com 
28 Ibid. 
29Susan E. Martonosi, D. S. O., Henry H. Willis, (2005). Evaluating the viability of 100 per cent container 
inspection at America's ports, RAND 
30 Ibid. 
31Orphan, V., E. Meunchau, et al. (2004). Advanced Cargo Container Scanning Technology Development. 7th 
Marine Transportation System Research & Technology Coordination Conference. National Academy of Sciences 
Building. Washington D.C., Transporation Research Board of the National Academies. 
32SAIC(2006) www.saic.com; Rapiscan Systems (2006) www.rapiscansystems.com 
33 Susan E. Martonosi, D. S. O., Henry H. Willis, (2005). Evaluating the viability of 100 per cent container 
inspection at America's ports, RAND. 
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equipment needed to accelerate electrons, x-ray scanners are much more expensive to own with 
an initial cost is $4.5 million and annual maintenance costs of $200,000. 
 
X-rays cause more radiation exposure, but there are existing technologies that can filter out much 
of the harmful radiation without compromising the imaging capability.  Minimal exclusion zones 
are needed for x-ray scanners. 
 
Radiation Detection 
One of the shortcomings of radiological imaging systems is their inability to differentiate 
between materials.  Imagery can depict shapes, but terrorists and illegal exporters are 
increasingly shaping contraband to look like legitimate cargo.  For example, imagery might show 
a truck full of cylindrical pipes but miss the fact that those pipes are stuffed with illegal drugs.  
Alternatively, plastic explosives can be molded into any shape, such as homemade ammonium-
nitrate and fuel-oil bombs shaped as simple plastic drums.34  Radiographic imaging cannot 
differentiate between materials used for explosives and those used for domestic home use, 
radiation detection can therefore be useful along side imaging, as was the case in the port of 
Hong Kong.  
 
Radiation detection may occur passively or actively.  The former is a deployed at CBP stations 
domestically and overseas.  Active radiation detection is a developing technology which uses 
neutron bombardment to identify radiating materials, and is discussed further in Appendix B. 
Passive 
Passive radiation detectors emit no radiation themselves, but rather are constructed with gamma-
ray detection material and neutron detectors.  Currently, the most common form of passive 
radiation detection comes from “radiation portal monitors” (RPMs) at seaport terminals, mail 
and package-handling facilities, land crossings and vehicle screening venues. The RPMs are set 
up much like highway toll booths, with one detection panel on either side of the passing 
container (Figure 5).  Each of the panels detect both gamma-ray and neutron radiation.  In 
addition to the fixed-site variants shown below, RPMs are deployed as mobile units and remotely 
operated units, which integrate radiation detection with remote surveillance technology to 
provide monitoring where human operation is difficult. 
 
                                                 
34 Brown, Douglas R. “Combined Technology for Cargo Security.” Ancore Corporation. 
http://www.maritimesecurityexpo.com/whitepapersarticles/Combined%20Technology%20for%20Cargo%20Securit
y-Maritime%20Security%200.pdf 
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Figure 5: Fixed-site passive radiation portal monitoring35 
 
Because of their passive nature their average throughput is 30 km/hr.  However, they tend to be 
triggered by materials that are naturally radioactive, such as plantains, kitty litter and fertilizer. 
Significant work is being done to improve detection algorithms for improved detection rates. 
 
The largest shortcoming of passive radiation detectors are their susceptibility to missing 
radioactive materials that are shielded by lead or another high-Z material. For example they 
cannot detect amounts of highly enriched uranium of less than 1 kg when lightly shielded.  
Chemical Detection 
Chemical trace detection systems or explosive trace detection (ETD) devices are being widely 
used in the air transportation industry and increasingly in container scanning.  There are 
currently three types of chemical screening technologies: traditional chemical composition tests, 
trained dog programs and non-intrusive chemical detection. Chemical detection technologies can 
be very useful in conjunction with other scanning methods, however currently they are still being 
developed. 
 
Biological Detection 
Traditional biological detection techniques utilize bioassays, or biochips, to identify presence of 
bio-weapon agents.  While these tests are accurate, they are highly intrusive and may take four 
hours or longer per test.  Another Argonne-developed set of sensors measures dielectric 
signatures to identify potential biological hazards much earlier in the screening process.  
Dielectric materials as non-conducting and exhibit a dielectric constant that can be measured at 
T-ray frequencies.  The new technology shows promise for fast early detection of biological 
agents in gases, powders or aerosols. 
 
A further discussion of x-ray, active radiation, and chemical detection technologies that are being 
developed and may have a future impact on 100% cargo scanning is provided in appendix B.  
                                                 
35 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief 2007, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Budget_BIB-
FY2007.pdf 
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Technology and Policy 
There exists a strong interaction between scanning technologies and policies to increase 
scanning. In a more transparent sense, technology acts as an enabler for the policy, as mentioned 
above it is necessary for the technology to be available and practical in order to implement a 
100% cargo scanning policy. With this in mind the goals and scope of a policy must be decided, 
keeping current technologies in mind  
 
On the other hand technology development will be strongly influenced by the existence of a 
scanning policy. Despite the absence of a clear scanning policy, technologies continue to be 
developed and improved; some of this development has been discussed. With the adoption of a 
100% cargo scanning policy, investment in more efficient technologies will increase, allowing 
for the creation of better technology than is currently in place. As this new technology is 
developed it will affect the policies, meaning policy makers must be mindful of this interaction 
when considering scanning policies.    
3. Cost  
 
Cost is the most commonly cited barrier to 100% cargo scanning.  The economic implications of 
100% cargo scanning extend not only to the cost of the technology and direct implementation 
(including labor and maintenance), but also to delays in the supply chain and creation of 
supporting systems.  It is generally assumed that there is an efficiency – security tradeoff and 
that by increasing cargo security the efficiency of the supply chain decreases and delays follow.  
This section of the report will explore both direct and indirect costs associated with 100% 
scanning. 
 
Most discussions of 100% scanning have revolved around determining whether the benefits of 
the policy warrant the costs.  The primary benefit of scanning all cargo containers is generally 
accepted to be decreasing the risk of a terrorist attack.  In order to meaningfully compare a 
reduction in risk to a cost in dollars, most analyses have examined the cost of a terrorist attack to 
compare with the cost of implementing 100% cargo scanning.  We will review a recent cost 
benefit analysis that examines the cost of both 100% scanning and a terrorist attack to try to 
determine whether a 100% scanning policy is economically justified. 
Costs of 100% Cargo Scanning 
The cost of implementing and operating a 100% container scanning program are usually reported 
on a per container basis.  These estimates range from $6.5036 to $12537 per container.  This large 
range of estimated costs between different studies can be attributed to differences in the level of 
technology implemented in the study and estimates of the supporting labor needed to staff the 
program.  The $6.50 figure is particularly low as it is based on 100% scanning at the Port of 
Hong Kong, where containers were scanned, but scanning images were not interpreted.  In this 
estimate, labor costs are significantly underestimated because the most human-intensive aspects 
                                                 
36 Ortolani, A. and R. Block (2005). Hong Kong port project hardens container security. The Wall Street Journal. 
New York. 
37 Rep. Edward Markey (D-MA), Press Release April 24, 2006: Port Security Amendment to Screen All Cargo to be 
Offered. 
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of operation—image interpretation and ensuing physical inspection—are omitted.  A more 
complete 100% scanning program is typically estimated to cost roughly $100 / container. 
 
The average cost of shipping a container from an Asian port to an American west-coast port is 
$4000.38  The high estimate of $125 / container represents only 3.1% of the total shipping cost.  
When compared with the average value of goods carried by a container, $66,00039, the cost of 
scanning is 0.2% of the container’s value.  Stephen Flynn estimates that this cost can be shared 
such that the cost increase to U.S. retailers would be on the order of 0.06%.40 
 
While the direct costs of implementing a scanning program are small, and could be digested, it 
the indirect costs that represent the most intimidating cost barrier to 100% scanning.  The most 
prominent indirect cost is that caused by delay in the supply chain.  It is most likely this that 
causes many commercial and shipping companies to balk at the price tag of 100% scanning.  
Table 1 summarizes direct and indirect costs of 100% scanning.   
 
Table 1:  Direct and indirect costs of a 100% scanning program 
 
Direct Costs Indirect Costs 
Technology 
• Procurement 
• Maintenance 
Labor 
• Training 
• Day-to-day operations 
Delay 
• Ruination (perishables) 
• Misses sailing window 
• Increased inventories 
 
Direct Costs 
Technology 
Scanning technology is a significant capital cost and needs to be maintained to maintain 
performance.  X-ray scanners cost approximately $4.5 million with an estimated annual 
operating cost of $200,000.  Distributing the up-front cost over ten years and combining with the 
operating cost provides an annual cost.  For x-ray scanners this is $650,000.  Gamma ray 
scanners cost approximately $1 million with an annual operating cost of $90,000: an estimated 
annual cost of $190,000.  Radiation portal monitors are approximately $1 million and can 
reasonably be expected to have a similar operating cost as gamma ray scanners.41 
 
The total cost of scanning equipment is determined by multiplying the cost/scanner by the 
number of scanners required.  One way to determine the total number of scanners required at a 
single port is to divide the total rate of containers / hour at the port by the containers / hour that 
the specific scanning equipment can process.  Extra capacity should be purchased to handle busy 
deviations from the average that are a result of the batch-like nature of unloading cargo carriers.  
                                                 
38 Flynn, S. E. (2006). Port Security is Still a House of Cards. Foreign Affairs 85(1). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 All data taken from Martonosi, S. E., D. S. Ortiz, et al. (2005). Evaluating the viability of 100 per cent container 
inspection at America's ports, RAND Corporation. 
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One study estimates that the cost of purchasing gamma-ray scanners and radiation portal 
monitors in every major port of the world would cost $1.5 billion (Flynn 2006).  Estimates 
should be based on a queue model that mimics the non-steady-state nature of port operations and 
that also predicts future capacity at ports.         
Labor 
Labor is needed to operate equipment and interpret scanning images.  One study estimates that 
four workers are needed per piece of scanning equipment: one to operate the technology and 
three more to perform the slower task of image interpretation.  The annual cost of this labor can 
be determined by the equation 
Technology labor cost
(# workers/scanner/shift)*(shifts/day)*salary
# of scanners
=  
 
where the number of operators per scanner per shift is estimated to be four and the number of 
shifts per day is three (eight hour shifts).  A U.S. port operator salary is $50,00042, while the cost 
to staff foreign posts with U.S. port authorities could cost as much as $500,00043.  Clearly the 
choice to scan at foreign ports is significantly more expensive than domestic ports from the 
perspective of labor costs.  Labor costs thus calculated can range anywhere from $600,000 per 
scanner to $6 million per scanner. 
 
Detection from scanners will result in further investigation by means of hand inspections.  The 
detection by a scanner may result from an actual detection or a false detection, both mandate 
hand inspections.  Hand inspections are timely and require additional labor resources.  This study 
will not assess the cost of additional equipment for hand-investigation, but rather just estimate 
the cost of labor for inspection.  The annual inspection labor cost can be estimated as 
 
Inspection labor cost scanning rate/scanner
*false positive rate * (# workers/team)*(shifts/day)*salary
# of scanners inspection rate/team
=  
 
where the scanning rate per scanner is estimated to be twelve containers per hour44; the 
inspection rate for a team of five workers is one container per 24 hr; the false positive rate is 5%; 
and there are three shifts per day.45  Inspection costs per scanner could range anywhere from 
$10.8 million (domestic) per scanner to $108 million per scanner (foreign), although this latter 
figure is somewhat inflated as inspection teams could employ local, lower-cost workers.  It is 
important to note that advanced technology could dramatically reduce this labor cost on two 
fronts: (1) reducing the false positive rate; (2) increase the inspection rate per team by guiding 
teams to specific regions of the container so that they don’t have to investigate all areas of the 
                                                 
42 Martonosi, S. E., D. S. Ortiz, et al. (2005). Evaluating the viability of 100 per cent container inspection at 
America's ports, RAND Corporation. 
43 Interview with Stephen Flynn, November 29, 2006. 
44 This is based on the commonly accepted value of 15 minutes for interpretation, which with three inspectors doing 
interpretation adds up to 12 containers per hour.  15 minutes is presented in Martonosi, S. E., D. S. Ortiz, et al. 
(2005). Evaluating the viability of 100 per cent container inspection at America's ports, RAND Corporation. 
45 Martonosi, S. E., D. S. Ortiz, et al. (2005). Evaluating the viability of 100 per cent container inspection at 
America's ports, RAND Corporation. 
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container with the same level of scrutiny.  Clearly, however, the labor costs associated with 
physical inspection overwhelm any labor costs associated with operation of technology. 
Indirect Costs 
Delay 
Increased delay is one of the primary concerns surrounding proposals for 100% container 
scanning.  It is perhaps the most intimidating of all costs, because it is somewhat harder to 
quantify than labor and technology costs.  The unknown nature of delay costs certainly does little 
allay stakeholders fears.  Additionally, the variable nature of delay costs makes them amenable 
to often being quoted as ‘worst-case scenario’, where they certainly are extremely costly.  One 
such quote is that a global delay of one day for all containers would cost $7 billion.46  It is hard 
to imagine a scenario produced by scanning where a one day delay would be imposed on all 
containers, but the staggering consequence is enough for people to think twice about the 
tradeoffs between security and efficiency. 
 
Delay costs are not a continuous function where cost increases linearly with time.  Rather, they 
are more of a step function where if the cargo is delayed sufficiently such that it misses its 
shipping window, then the cost of delay jumps up.  If however, the delay is on the order of 
minutes or maybe a few hours and the cargo is still onboard its scheduled carrier, then there is 
really no cost associated with the delay.   
 
Delay costs depend upon the nature of cargo being shipped.  Perishables might lose their entire 
value if they are delayed significantly.  Cargo critical to downstream manufacturing could slow 
down production and economic activity as companies wait for the shipment to arrive.  This is 
especially problematic with the rise of ‘just-in-time’ manufacturing because companies have 
very little inventory to keep them afloat while waiting for shipments.  Delays might force 
companies to stock larger inventories as a contingency plan for any shipping delays.  Larger 
inventories represent a large capital cost and tie-up of financial resources.  This scenario would 
certainly be the case for delays that are unpredictable.  However, if delays become predictable 
and routine so that instead they may be incorporated into companies’ estimations for time of 
passage, then it is likely that the problem could be solved without having to float large 
inventories.  
 
A recent study by RAND acknowledged the difficulty of estimating delay costs by selecting 
three different values: $0, $6, and $60 per TEU-hour.47  Their cost benefit analysis (which will 
be discussed in the next section) indicated that the decision to implement 100% scanning is 
dependent upon which delay cost is selected for the analysis.  Better understanding of delay costs 
would certainly help predict the effects of 100% scanning and mollify stakeholders’ concerns 
about associated costs. 
 
                                                 
46 O'Hanlon, M. E., P. R. Orszag, et al. (2002). Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis. 
Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution. 
47 Martonosi, S. E., D. S. Ortiz, et al. (2005). Evaluating the viability of 100 per cent container inspection at 
America's ports, RAND Corporation. 
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It is important to note that the amount of delay is a function of the technology and labor 
employed in 100% scanning.  The type and amount of technology will affect delay, as will the 
number of port inspectors.  Lastly, the design of how scanning technology and labor interact with 
the larger port operations will also have an important impact on delay times. 
Benefits of 100% Scanning 
It is difficult to estimate the benefits of 100% scanning, especially if a dollar sign is to precede 
those benefits.  There is also a question of whether it is appropriate to economically justify a 
program that is within the realm of national security.  For disaster prevention, such as 100% 
scanning, the typical approach has been to begin by comparing the cost of the prevention with 
the cost of the disaster to determine whether they are at least comparable (or that that the cost of 
disaster is much higher than the cost of prevention, which would be even more favorable).  We 
will review some recent efforts to estimate the cost of an attack on a U.S. port for us in a cost 
benefit analysis and also discuss the problems with trying use such a method. 
 
We will also briefly mention some other benefits of 100% scanning that have more to do with 
day-to-day operations than with the cost of an attack.  These benefits are not widely publicized 
and may help to win stakeholder support if considered more closely. 
Cost of an Attack 
Depending on its magnitude, a terrorist attack on a U.S. port is generally considered to cost 
anywhere from $1 billion to $1 trillion dollars.  The 2004 RAND cost benefit analysis puts this 
range within context by looking at the cost of other terrorist attacks and tragedies (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Estimated costs of various terrorist attacks / natural disasters48 
Attack / Disaster Cost  
1993 World Trade Center $510 million 
1995 Oklahoma City Bomb $125 million 
9/11 > $100 billion 
1992 Hurricane Andrew $100 billion 
Simulated U.S. Port shutdown $58 billion 
Simulated terrorist nuclear attack $600 billion 
 
A recent study estimated the costs of a 10 kiloton nuclear explosion at the port of Long Beach to 
be $1 trillion.  (For reference, the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasake were 15 
and 21 kiloton respectively.  Nuclear weapon tests recently performed by India and Pakistan 
were on the order of 10 kiloton).49  The costs involved in this estimate were directly tied to loss 
of life and infrastructure/property (see Table 3). 
 
In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, ports would close and operate at a substantially reduced 
level for days, weeks, possibly even months.  In 2002, members of the Longshoremen Union all 
along the West Coat went on strike for 10 days and it is estimated this cost anywhere from $4.7 
                                                 
48 Martonosi, S. E., D. S. Ortiz, et al. (2005). Evaluating the viability of 100 per cent container inspection at 
America's ports, RAND Corporation. 
49 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon_yield 
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to 19.4 billion.50  Booz-Allen-Hamilton conducted a war game in 2003 with experts where ports 
closed for twelve days after an terrorist attack, but it took three months to clear the backlog 
created by this closure.  Costs for such an incident were estimated to be $58 billion.51   
 
Table 3: Direct costs of 10 kiloton attack at Port of Long Beach52 
 
 
It is difficult to directly translate the cost of an attack to the benefit of a prevention method.  
While it may be more convenient to compare dollars to dollars, the actual benefit of a 
preventative program is reduced risk.  The recent RAND cost benefit study tried to incorporate 
this as well as the cost of an attack into their analysis with the following equation: 
 
(Cost of 100% - Cost of baseline)
p(Attack)=
Attack cost [p(100% prevents attack - p(baseline prevents attack)]
 
 
where p designates a probability.  The probability of attack is defined as the annual probability of 
attack threshold for which the program is cost-effective.  Thus, if plugging the numbers into the 
right-hand side of the equation yields 0.80, then it must be generally accepted that there is at 
least an 80% chance of an attack of that magnitude for the program to be justified.53   
 
                                                 
50 Willis, H. H. and D. S. Ortiz (2004). Evaluating the Security of the Global Containerized Supply Chain, RAND 
Corporation. 
51 Gerencser, M. , J. Weinberg and D. Vincent (2003). Port security war game: implications for U.S. supply chains, 
McLean, VA, Booz Allen Hamilton. 
52 Meade, C. and R. C. Molander (2006). Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack, RAND 
Corporation. 
53 Willis, H. H. and D. S. Ortiz (2004). Evaluating the Security of the Global Containerized Supply Chain, RAND 
Corporation. 
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There are some challenges with using such a cost benefit analysis to look at 100% scanning.  
First, national security measures are not undertaken strictly with an economic justification.  
Certainly, there is an economic consideration of the cost and impact, but the primary justification 
is a perceived need for security.  Second, the probability of a terrorist attack is extremely difficult 
to estimate.  It is even more difficult to predict how a 100% scanning program would deter 
terrorist attacks.  It is more likely that this would be the primary benefit of scanning all 
containers, rather than detection of any WMD. 
 
The direct benefit of a preventative national security program is reduced risk.  Unfortunately, 
risk is not a very tangible measure of success that can easily be measured.  It is somewhat of a 
leap to equate this reduced risk with the costs of the prevented attack.  How can one measure the 
success of 100% scanning to see whether it’s providing the benefit of a reduced probability of 
attack?  Risk reduction is hard to measure and therefore it’s hard to determine whether a 100% 
scanning policy is truly successful.         
Day-to-day Benefits of 100% Scanning 
There are a few benefits that 100% scanning might provide in the daily operations of the supply 
chain.  Considering these additional benefits will help to more fully understand and evaluate the 
pros and cons of 100% scanning.  Scanning all containers might help CBP to identify 
misrepresented cargo and collect associated tariffs.54  Additionally 100% scanning would 
presumably accelerate the development of anti-tamper devices that include GPS devices.  Real-
time tracking of containers could reveal inefficiencies in current supply chain operations. 
 
Building scanning stations and integrating them into port operations have the advantage of being 
designed as a seamless operation, whereas currently scanning only 5% of containers is a 
somewhat topical operation forced on top of port operations.  Current procedures are disruptive 
as it takes a lot of time and extra port space to pull a container out of a stack, move it to scanners, 
and restack it properly so that it can be unloaded at the proper port of call. 
 
Lastly, there is the hard-to-quantify benefit of building confidence in the supply chain.  This 
confidence is instilled in the American public, port operators, port authorities, port workers, 
companies who rely on maritime shipping, etc.  Confidence in a secure system is important in 
day-to-day operations and certainly in the aftermath of a ‘near-miss’ terrorist plot.  Greater 
confidence could reduce the downtime ports would experience after a threat of even an attack. 
4. Logistical Difficulties 
 
In this section, we present implementation options for a 100% cargo container scan and the 
barriers relevant to each.  We then present recommendations for the best approach. Before 
introducing a large-scale scanning initiative, four questions must be answered: 
i. Where in the supply chain should cargo containers be scanned? 
ii. How should cargo containers be scanned? 
                                                 
54 Martonosi, S. E., D. S. Ortiz, et al. (2005). Evaluating the viability of 100 per cent container inspection at 
America's ports, RAND Corporation. 
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iii. When should scan data be viewed? 
iv. How should risk screening be incorporated? 
i. Where in the Supply Chain Should Cargo be Scanned? 
Four points in the supply chain were identified and critiqued on the basis of the following 
criteria: consequence of attack, risk of tamper, trustworthiness of scan, and technology cost to 
the U.S.  The four options are illustrated in Figure 6. Because of their similarity, the 
upstream/downstream options are considered together, and then two port options are considered.   
 
 
Figure 6: Options for scanning along the supply chain   
Option A: Upstream/Downstream from a Port 
 
Upstream from a foreign port 
Exporting firms could be allowed to contract security scanning with approved third-party 
security organizations to conduct cargo container scanning along their supply chain.  The direct 
cost of buying, installing, and operating scanning technology would be borne by foreign firms, 
and so the direct technology cost to the U.S. would be very low, if not zero.  
 
Another advantage of scanning at this point in the supply chain is the ability to detect threats 
before they arrive in the U.S.  This option can be thought of as extending the protective border 
around the country.  
 
The primary disadvantage of scanning cargo upstream of a foreign port is the high variability in 
scan quality and trustworthiness.  Because of a lack of government oversight outside the foreign 
port, shippers and distribution centers would be free to dictate their own scan procedures.  It 
would be very difficult to enforce a 100% scan requirement, although there are a few tactics that 
could be used to ensure consistency and reliability.  The U.S. and foreign governments could 
partake in the selection of acceptable third-party security firms and the establishment of 
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requirements which approved firms must follow.  In addition, all cargo scanned and approved 
prior to arriving at the port of export could be signed off and sealed by the security agents.  
Foreign governments could be allowed to determine the level of background security checks 
required for third-party security agents. 
 
Downstream from a U.S. port 
The C-TPAT program could be extended to allow trusted firms special authority to scan their 
own cargo after it has left domestic ports.  However, if a terrorist’s goal is to smuggle a weapon 
into a U.S. port where it can be released or detonated, then a domestic scanning policy offers no 
protection. 
 
Yet there are still reasons to perform container scans after cargo arrives in the U.S., including the 
possibility that a previously scanned container has been tampered with after it passed a scan 
overseas. A scan in the U.S. thus serves as a supplement to tamper-prevention devices, ensuring 
that a container has remained secure and its contents unaltered from the last time it was scanned 
for threats.  
 
In this scenario, direct technology costs to the U.S. government may be low, but costs to U.S. 
firms may be high.  
Option B: At a U.S./Foreign Port 
 
At a U.S. Port 
Performing cargo container scanning at a domestic port has the potential to utilize the best 
scanning technology, most scrutinized procedures, and most trustworthy personnel, but is 
inherently less secure than any of the earlier options because it occurs on U.S. homeland. As was 
mentioned previously, however, domestic scans may serve as a function to review cargo contents 
and make sure that containers have not been tampered with following a foreign security check. 
 
Besides the added capability to protect against smuggling attempts following a foreign scan, 
domestic container scanning at a U.S. port is also logistically easier than foreign scans. Because 
CBP and Coast Guard have direct control over cargo container and pot security at all U.S. ports, 
many of the problems associated with CSI are not relevant. For example, no parties can refuse a 
CBP container scan at domestic ports, as foreign governments have the right to do when CSI 
teams target containers abroad. Furthermore, all private personnel at a U.S. port are subject to 
background checks, per the Maritime Transportation Security Act, and CBP officials conduct 
container scans themselves, unlike at CSI ports where CBP officials target containers and then 
request foreign security personnel to conduct the scan.  
 
Scanning technology is also easier to upgrade and monitor at domestic ports. While CSI 
currently has no minimum technical requirements for scanning technology, CBP can easily 
institute performance standards for cargo containers as part of its authority to oversee cargo 
security.  
 
Still, performing scans at a U.S. port requires CBP, port authority, terminal operators, and 
shipping company officials to work together in order to find the most efficient method possible. 
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According to Professor Yossi Sheffi, some of the most restricted segments of the international 
supply chain are the half-mile routes leading away from a U.S. dock, including cargo loading 
areas and cargo waiting areas55.  Accordingly, it is especially important to perform scans during 
periods when containers are being moved (as when they are transferred off the ship) or are being 
stored in a waiting area, so as not to impose costly delays. 
 
At a foreign port 
Identifying cargo threats far away from the U.S. mainland provides the greatest level of security 
to Americans, which is the primary advantage of this option.   
 
Cargo scanning conducted at foreign ports is overseen by the foreign government, so the scans 
are of a higher standard than those conducted upstream from a foreign port.  However, a pressing 
issue with foreign scanning is that of the host nation’s sovereignty over the port.  A foreign 
government has the right to refuse a scan of any or all cargo containers. With the U.S.’ current 
predominance as a world trade partner, this is of little concern in the short-term.  Yet as Asian 
and European firms gain trade superiority over the U.S., we may need to reconsider incentives 
for foreign ports to scan at 100% levels. 
 
 
Table 4: Cargo scan location consequence matrix 
 
     
Preferred location: At a foreign port 
If one of the goals of 100% cargo container scanning is, as we have stated previously, to build 
resiliency into the supply chain while minimizing delays, then scanning at foreign ports provides 
the best solution.  Foreign scans in general provide the greatest protection from WMD attacks 
through extension of the U.S. border (Table 4).  Within a foreign country, port scans provide the 
best government oversight and hence maintenance of standards.  Finally, foreign scans result in 
the lowest technology cost to the U.S., as foreign entities become responsible for purchasing, 
installing and operating all scanning equipment. 
                                                 
55 Interview with Prof. Yossi Sheffi, October 27, 2006 
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ii. How Should Cargo Containers be Scanned? 
After Unloading 
On average, cargo containers spend 48 hours at a port before they are loaded onto a ship for their 
trip overseas.56  These 48 hours comprise the period after the container is brought into the port by 
truck or rail and stacked in a holding area by crane.  It is important to note, however, that 
isolating a specific container once it has been stacked involves an hours-long process of locating 
the container, pulling it from the stack, transporting it to a scanning portal and then restacking it.  
This process may cause a significant delay in the supply chain as port personnel spend their time 
stacking and restacking containers inefficiently, and thus this option is undesirable.  
At Port Entry 
Scanning at port entry involves setting up a series of radiation and imaging portals not unlike 
highway toll booths, and coordinating the flow of trucks entering the port through the detection 
portals.  While the trucks need to slow to approximately 5 mph in order to produce useful scans, 
the consequent delay is only a few seconds, rather than a few hours with the previous method.  
The slowing can be accomplished using a series of speed bumps and 180-degree turns leading up 
to the portal, as was accomplished in Hong Kong.  This method also provides a method for 
control, as detection portals are installed at all points of entry to the port.   
 
It is our recommendation that all scanning that occurs as part of a 100% container scanning 
program be implemented at the points of entry at foreign ports, in a manner similar to the Hong 
Kong pilot project.  
 
Figure 7: Where to scan at a port 
iii. When Should Scan Data be Viewed? 
Container images and radiation data do not need to be viewed at the same time that scanning is 
performed. Because image viewing typically requires up to fifteen minutes for accurate 
assessment, it should be done outside the supply chain bottleneck. 
 
Yet regardless of whether the images are viewed when trucks drive through the portals, or 
whether they are stored and viewed at some time during the 48 hours that the container will 
spend at the port, viewing 100% of cargo containers implies that 5% of all containers will need 
to be physically inspected due to the 5% false positive rate of current technology. 
 
                                                 
56 Interview with Steve Flynn, November 27, 2006 
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In order to physically examine 5% of all containers in the international supply chain, land and 
labor requirements would need to increase by a factor of 20 at ports on average, according to the 
estimates of a RAND study.57 Even if enough inspectors could be hired, there is not enough 
available land near major ports to makes this feasible. This makes viewing 100% of all scanned 
images simply impractical with current technology, and in turn makes this possibly the most 
important barrier to overcome.  
 
 
Figure 8: When to view scan data 
iv. How Should Risk Screening be Incorporated? 
Current cargo scanning policies utilize risk analysis to screen manifest data and target a fraction 
of containers for scanning. In a 100% scanning policy this is unnecessary because all containers 
are scanned. However, we argue that—because it is impractical to scan and view 100% of cargo 
containers—scanning and viewing tasks should be separated and risk analysis should be 
employed to determine which data are actually viewed.  
 
Not imposing any additional land or labor requirements on ports means keeping the current 
physical inspection rate constant at 0.25% of all cargo. To accomplish that, only 5% of scan data 
can be viewed because of the 5% false positive rate associated with current scanning technology.  
 
Therefore, risk screening should be used to identify the 5% of containers whose scan data should 
be interpreted and reviewed.   
 
A graphical representation of the current and proposed scanning implementation is shown in 
Figure 9.  Note that a primary distinction with respect to the application of risk analysis is that in 
the current process risk analysis determines which containers are scanned, whereas in the 
proposed process risk analysis determines which scan images are viewed.   
 
                                                 
57 Susan E. Martonosi, D. S. O., Henry H. Willis, (2005). Evaluating the viability of 100 per cent container 
inspection at America's ports, RAND. 
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Figure 9: Current and proposed scanning process 
 
The overall effect of the recommendations presented in this section are a net-zero change in 
cargo delays resulting from physical inspections, but a 20-fold increase in scanning rates.  In 
addition, the storing of 100% scan data builds resiliency into the system and allows for post-facto 
examination of any container in the system without incurring additional delays.  Furthermore, as 
technology improves, the viewing rates can increase while maintaining the current levels of 
delay. 
5. Stakeholder Support 
 
Even the most well defined and efficient cargo scanning policies may fail without stakeholder 
support.  In many potential high profile programs there exists a myriad of stakeholders with 
varying motives, prompting a need for compromise. For 100% cargo scanning policy, 
stakeholders can be organized into eight different categories:  
 
1. U.S. Department of Homeland Security –the CBP and Infrastructure divisions and 
respective initiatives; 
2. U.S. Legislators –both the legislative representatives and their constituents;  
3. Foreign Governments – particularly countries hosting ports, shipping U.S.-bound 
cargo, as well as critical trade partners; 
4. Retailers/Manufacturers (R&Ms)–businesses (foreign and domestic) that require 
shipping lanes to support supply chain integrity and the industry associations 
responsible for representing company interests; 
5. Port Authorities –both private and public; 
6. Terminal Operators/Ocean Carriers – All businesses operating terminals, (both 
associated with a retailer/manufacturer or independent) and/or contracting cargo 
transport services; 
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7. Longshoremen – Unionized labor responsible for loading and unloading cargo at the 
ports; and 
8. Ground Transportation – Ground transportation contractors, including drivers.   
 
Although these categories can be further decomposed, this higher level categorizing provides a 
basic understanding of the involved parties and interactions.  Stakeholder alignment may vary for 
different issues given individual motivations and core values. Figure 10 includes all stakeholders 
and the list of issues highlighted in this study. The following sections detail stakeholder 
alignments and important trade-offs to consider for successful resolution. 
 
 
Figure 10: Radial diagram of stakeholders and key issues  
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Port Throughput 
Port throughput refers to the speed with which cargo containers move into and out of the port 
perimeter.  Accumulation of containers at a port restricts the ability to execute daily operations.  
Land area limitations and “just in time” manufacturing reduce the tolerance for lower throughput 
rates.  Therefore, enacting policies that may impede port throughput rates will be strongly 
contested by many stakeholders (Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 11: Radial diagram of stakeholders for port throughput 
 
Terminal Operators/Ocean Carriers and Ground Transporters are paid by retailers and 
manufacturers for the number of containers moved, and thus these individuals are very motivated 
to accelerate port throughput with less regard to extraneous operations, such as security.  
Likewise, the ability of the port authority to maintain adequate throughput to limit container 
accumulation is reflected in the port reputation.  Port authorities with high throughput rates 
attract better business since R&Ms are responsible for establishing supply chain logistics, 
including selection of shipping ports.  R&Ms are often dependent on “just in time” supply chain 
tactics.  Any delay in container delivery may adversely impact their ability to produce and thus 
profits.  Furthermore, U.S. legislators respond to demanding R&Ms, who are both constituents 
and associations with political lobby power.  However, the U.S. legislators are also responsible 
to the constituents they represent, and possess a sense of duty to national security.  Therefore, 
U.S. legislators understand the potential necessity of slowing the process to implement security 
measures. 
 
The efficiency-security tradeoff between rapid throughput and national security cannot be 
ignored.  Policy implementing increased security procedures will most likely impact throughput 
rates, but must carefully consider the magnitude of delay and attempt to mitigate the delay with 
improved technologies.  
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Supply Chain Security 
Securing integrity of the supply chain is crucial to maintain confidence in trade.  One key factor 
for supply chain integrity is the ability to efficiently transport cargo globally to and from R&Ms.  
This ability includes the robustness of the transportation system to respond to delays and varying 
rates of flow.  Stakeholders with a vested interest are shown in Error! Reference source not 
found.. 
 
 
Figure 12: Radial diagram of stakeholders for supply chain security 
 
Ground transporters, terminal operators/ocean carriers, and port authorities essentially work for 
the supply chain; their job utility is a function of the supply chain process.  Thus, protecting the 
supply chain is vital to their employment.  R&Ms are also reliant on the supply chain to maintain 
daily production and sales.  Business trends in the U.S. have leaned towards diversification and 
outsourcing, as well as reliance on foreign suppliers rather than internal production.  This 
diversity requires a strong supply chain to allow expedient reaction to needs and reduce the 
burden of overstock.  However, many R&Ms consider this reliance confidential, and thus do not 
wish to fully disclose contents of shipments to or from business partners.  Furthermore, U.S. 
legislators are again influenced by R&Ms and their lobbying associations, but maintain the 
responsibility to constituent protection in terms of both safety against a threat and their roles as 
consumers.  Foreign governments interpret scanning and inspection processes as a violation of 
privacy and trust. 
 
The tradeoff between security and privacy is most debated under supply chain security.  R&Ms 
may not wish to fully disclose the contents of shipments to preserve propriety of customers; 
likewise, implementation in foreign ports implies sovereignty questions, which may be offensive 
to trade partners.  Scanning officials may lack authority to mandate full disclosure in foreign 
countries, thereby hindering policy implementation.  National security may require less 
individual privacy, which may not be supported by all stakeholders who perceive this as 
someone else’s problem.  Stakeholders are not aligned on this issue, and therefore significant 
consideration must be given when seeking to reach compromise. 
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Regional Security 
Regional security refers to security within the immediate area of the port.  The most outspoken 
advocates for this issue are thus stakeholders that are directly involved with the port or co-
located in the immediate vicinity.  Figure 13 illustrates the stakeholders interested in regional 
security. 
 
 
Figure 13: Radial diagram of stakeholders for regional security 
 
The mission of DHS, specifically CBP, is to protect the national infrastructure from threats and 
ultimately provide national security.  Similarly, the individual port authorities are concerned for 
the safety of employees, and collectively they are interested in securing the ability to provide 
container transport.  U.S. legislators, as previously mentioned, are engaged by a sense of duty to 
constituents to provide national security.  However, national security differs from regional 
security, thus causing diversity among legislators, respective of the geographic location of those 
they represent. Foreign governments are in a difficult situation in that foreign regional security 
might be compromised by holding dangerous containers in foreign ports.  
 
Regional security presents a significant trade off between security and equity. In an attempt to 
maintain security within regions of the U.S., foreign entities have to pay for scanning, also as 
mentioned above, foreign ports are risking their own regional security by holding potentially 
dangerous cargo. This means that foreign ports are not getting an amount of security proportional 
to what they are paying for the program, meaning they are not being treated equally to the U.S. 
For the time being this may not be a problem because the U.S. is such an attractive trading 
partner; however policy makers must ask whether this will still be the case in the future. If the 
U.S. looses its attraction then foreign ports may find the lack of equity unacceptable and will 
stop scanning for the U.S. or even trading with the U.S. altogether.  
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Cost of Program 
This report has already discussed the large amount of funding that will be required in order to 
implement a 100% scanning program.  Figure 14 emphasizes the importance of cost; most 
stakeholders are concerned about the cost of the program, particularly when they are tagged to 
shoulder some of the costs. 
 
 
Figure 14: Radial diagram of stakeholders for cost of program 
 
The majority of scanning operations are carried out by organizations within DHS. An increase in 
percentage of cargo scanning creates a significantly higher resource demand for skilled personnel 
within the Department. Funding for DHS is directly allocated from the United States Federal 
Budget which indirectly impacts tax payers and their representatives. Foreign governments may 
be faced with funding technologies and land for operation if policy mandates significant foreign 
port operations. Retailers and manufacturers rebuff the possibility of bearing a greater share of 
the cost burden through higher taxes and tariffs; however this prospect is likely due to the 
recognized ability to pay. Port authorities fear potential requirements for expensive land 
expansions, as well as funding salaries for additional workers to meet demand expectations. 
Finally, terminal operators and ocean carriers may experience costs through contracts with 
retailers or possibly even costs of procuring additional containers with improved capabilities.  
 
The above stakeholders are faced with major tradeoffs involved with rising costs due to any 
program implementation. We have identified the tradeoff of efficiency versus equity as the most 
significant relative to cost. Efficiency is indeed a very important aspect of a successful cargo 
scanning policy; however achievement of greater scanning efficiency requires an investment in 
equipment and labor, creating the rise in costs discussed above, thus creating equity concerns. 
The issue of equity manifests itself in the sizes of the stakeholders. Wealthier stakeholders are 
able to bear the cost more easily, while smaller entities, such as third world nations and small 
shipping companies, may struggle with any additional burden. This imbalance of ability to pay 
causes significant resistance from companies, which have a great deal of political power.  
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Job Creation 
Policy for 100% cargo scanning creates increased demand for workers to perform implemented 
roles and functions. However, the quantity, type, and location of jobs required are specific to 
individual policies. This can cause variation in stakeholder alignment and promotion of policies 
dependent on motives. 
 
 
Figure 15: Radial diagram of stakeholders for jobs creation 
 
Any increase in scanning procedures requires additional longshoremen as operations become 
more complicated within the port.  However, this increase in necessary personnel may fall 
exclusively outside the U.S. Scanning policies calling for an increase in scanning and operations 
at foreign ports increase demand for American jobs located in foreign countries, which is more 
costly do to relocation and duty pays. Likewise, increased operations at foreign ports forces 
foreign governments to increase the number of employees. Employment is an important political 
issue in the United States. U.S. legislators have a vested interest in ensuring that policies create 
jobs within their represented districts, or at least maintain current employment levels. DHS also 
requires an increase in personnel billets due to growth in CSI (or similar programs), meaning 
more agents hired to work outside the U.S. Also, as previously mentioned, scanning at foreign 
ports necessitates improved vigilance in protecting cargo at sea, thereby creating a demand for 
additional Coast Guard positions as well. 
 
This highly political tradeoff between efficiency and equity creates difficult decisions for U.S. 
legislators. Efficiency of foreign port implementation must be balanced by U.S. perceptions of 
inequity of providing foreign rather than domestic jobs. Legislators struggle with the need for 
efficiency and concern for the constituents they represent, causing compromise in terms of both 
objectives. Longshoremen are unionized and will likely contest any reduction in labor force.   
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Worker Safety 
New technology solutions threaten worker safety and impose potential health hazards. 
Furthermore, worker safety procedures may be jeopardized to maintain efficient port throughput.  
 
 
Figure 16: Radial diagram of stakeholders for worker safety 
 
The primary stakeholders concerned with worker safety are longshoremen and the ground 
transportation. These categories include the workers that are exposed to the technology 
equipment implemented for scanning and thus are skeptical of the effects of radiation imaging 
and other detection scanning methods. These technologies require truck drivers to physically 
drive the cargo through intimidating scanners at slow speeds.  The exposure durations and 
repeated act of moving many containers may have adverse health consequences, making support 
from these workers difficult to negotiate.  U.S. legislators are also concerned about worker safety 
as representatives of these workers.  Also, compromise of supply chain integrity, as previously 
emphasized in this section, can be catastrophic, so new practices to mitigate delay is essential. 
However, new policy implementation creates new procedure, which increases the possibility of 
errors and safety hazards during the learning period and subjects workers to unknown hazards.  
 
The primary tradeoff for worker safety is between security and liberty. A 100% scanning 
policy’s attempts to create national security, however accomplish this goal the potential 
problems listed above are inevitable. This need for national security infringes on the workers 
liberty to be free from danger in their workplace.  Measures to overcome risks and provide 
proper precautions must be considered for policy creation and implementation.  
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IV. Channels and Resources 
 
We evaluated three channels that could be used to achieve 100% cargo container scanning: (1) a 
“business as usual” approach, (2) market education/incentives, and (3) legislative mandate.  
 
 
                        Figure 17: Channels to achieve a 100% cargo container scanning policy 
Business as Usual 
The Department of Homeland Security already possesses the authority to scan every U.S.-bound 
maritime container.  As DHS has been slowly increasing scanning rates since 2001,58 it is 
possible that 100% maritime cargo container scanning could be achieved by allowing DHS to 
continue on its current trajectory.  This approach, termed “business as usual,” or BAU, places 
total responsibility for achieving a 100% container scanning program within the Department of 
Homeland Security. 
 
The primary benefits of such an approach are flexibility and adaptability. By keeping the 
responsibility for program buildup within DHS, a BAU approach would allow the department to 
increase scanning rates according to its expertise and assessments of feasibility.   The department 
could set and revise timetables that dictate when scanning operations come on line in ports 
around the world, and determine how quickly scanning rates increase.  Moreover, because the 
DHS director would not be encumbered by external constraints, a BAU approach allows the 
secretary to allocate department resources (financial, as well as of labor and technology) as he 
sees fit. 
                                                 
58 Interview with Steve Flynn, November 27, 2006 
Channels to Achieve a 100% Cargo Container Scanning Policy 
 
 Business as usual (Administrative) 
 Adaptability, Flexibility 
 No guarantees, Varying executive support 
 
 Market education / incentives 
 Economically efficient, Stakeholder support 
 Uncertain participation, Appropriate? 
 
 Legislative 
 Guaranteed, Stable 
 Inflexible, Partisanship 
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A BAU approach that allows for flexible resource allocation also makes the program adaptable 
to changing threats.  If the threat of WMD varies in the future, DHS would easily be able to alter 
the performance requirements of the scanning technology or even shift focus from cargo 
container scanning to some other form of homeland protection.  
 
However, program flexibility is also one of the primary drawbacks associated with a BAU 
approach.  Not only might the cargo container scanning program change as an individual DHS 
director sees fit, the program may receive varying executive support as the political leadership of 
the department changes.  
  
Moreover, an even greater concern related to the BAU approach is that there is no guarantee that 
100% scanning rates will ever be achieved.  Because of this uncertainty, we find BAU an 
unacceptable road to take.  
Market Education/Incentives 
The success of the 100% container scanning pilot program at the Port of Hong Kong 
demonstrated that support for container scanning programs exists within industry.  Although the 
Hong Kong pilot has ended, we submit that it is possible to achieve 100% cargo container 
scanning at all ports by leveraging market mechanisms to make the idea more appealing.  This 
could be accomplished by providing financial incentives to shippers and ports which participate 
in a scanning program, in collaboration with an initiative that educates supply chain members on 
the resilient function of a 100% scanning program.  Tariffs for scanned containers could be 
lowered, subsidies for scanning technology could be offered, and communication between 
experts in government and industry could be organized.    
 
The primary benefits of a market approach are economic efficiency and the increasing support 
for the program created when stakeholders buy in to the scheme.   
 
For example, under a market-based approach, those firms that value cargo scanning will be the 
ones to expend time and resources to coordinate the effort.  Additionally, the firms that buy into 
the program will be more likely to care about the program’s success and adapt to problems that 
arise.   
 
Yet there is no way to predict how successful a market-based approach would be.  Some firms 
may value participation in a scanning program more than others, which would be difficult to 
reconcile with the nature of a program that is designed to scan 100% of cargo.  Would industry 
opponents be able to opt out of the program if it were achieved in this way? How could a 100% 
scanning program supported by only a fraction of industrial partners successfully operate?  
 
Moreover, some stakeholders may view a market-based approach as inappropriate in the context 
of cargo scanning as a national security measure.  Ultimately, we find that a market-based 
approach is critically flawed because of the uncertain participation it would inspire and the 
controversy inherent in a market solution to a national security concern.  
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Legislative Mandate 
Legislating 100% cargo container scanning is a more certain and direct method of achieving a 
successful policy than either of the previous options.  Moreover, one immediate effect of 
enacting a 100% cargo scan mandate will be increased interest in the development of improved 
scanning technologies, potentially lessening implementation burdens.  
 
Still, the legislative channel is a contentious one, as evidenced by the defeat of the Markey 
amendment.  From the beginning, retailers’ trade groups opposed the Markey amendment on the 
grounds that it would be bad for trade.59  The trade groups found allies in the Republican 
majority, which voted down the amendment before it could be attached to the bill.  Knowing the 
amendment would never be added to the Safe Ports bill, Markey offered his amendment during 
committee without risk and then criticized Republicans for being soft on national security after 
its defeat.  In the end, the issue of 100% cargo container scanning was exploited as a political 
wedge rather than for constructive debate.   
 
Another drawback of the legislative route is the difficulty of adapting the program to dynamic 
threats after a statute has been written.  Once a 100% cargo scanning law has been passed it will 
be very difficult to alter details of the program if they are expressed in the language of the act.  
This makes it more complicated to shift resources from one port to another, to upgrade 
performance standards, or to reallocate resources to some other form of terrorism prevention 
altogether.  
Preferred Method 
After weighing these options, we find that the only channel which guarantees that 100% cargo 
scanning will be achieved is the legislative approach.  However, we propose that any 100% 
cargo scanning legislation be written in a way that grants the Department of Homeland Security 
authority over program-specific details such as resource allocation and performance standards, in 
order to craft some degree of flexibility into the program.  
 
 
                                                 
59 “Retailers applaud rejection of Markey amendment to ‘Safe Ports Act,’ News release, Retailers Industry Leaders 
Association, April 2006 
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V. Conclusion & Recommendations 
Despite widely acknowledged vulnerabilities in the international supply chain, cargo security 
measures have not dramatically changed since 9/11.  This infrastructure, critical to the U.S. 
economy and global commerce, remains susceptible to being used as a means for delivering 
WMD to U.S. ports and beyond.  Current security measures designed to detect such weapons are 
inadequate and undermined by poor risk screening.  The existing security system does little to 
deter terrorists from attempting such an attack as nineteen of every twenty containers to enter 
this country are permitted entry without having to undergo the scrutiny of a WMD scan.  
Security experts agree that it is only a matter of time before a cargo container is used to deliver a 
terrorist attack to the U.S. 
 
Scanning every U.S.-bound container for WMD is an idea that would certainly improve the 
capability to detect and foil terrorist plots and therefore strongly deter any attempts to use cargo 
containers for such nefarious purposes.  Although, legislative efforts have been made to mandate 
100% scanning of maritime cargo containers, as yet they have failed.  This report addressed the 
barriers to both the successful adoption and implementation of a 100% scanning policy.   
 
We identified five barriers to a successful 100% scanning program: 
 
• Ambiguity.  Opposition has rallied around vague definitions of policy goals and 
implementation to block passage of legislative measures.  Policy makers have not been 
clear about whether the primary goal of proposed programs is to detect threats, deter 
threats, or to design resiliency into the supply chain so that it can function even in the 
face of threats.  The lack of clear implementation guidelines for the type of detection 
required in 100% scanning has also hampered legislative bills. 
 
• Technology limitations.  Scanning technology capable of detecting radioactive material 
and imaging container contents while allowing high container throughput at a port is 
commercially available today. Yet the technology is not foolproof.  Radiation detection is 
easily foiled by lead shielding.  Imaging requires interpretation of shapes that may appear 
to be harmless.  The false positive rates of both technologies demand further inspection 
for 5% of scanned containers.  Chemical and biological weapon scanners are still in 
development.   
 
• Cost.  The direct costs of 100% scanning are palatable, although the labor cost associated 
with ensuing physical inspections is a significant barrier to implementing a program 
where 5% of all containers are physically inspected.  Indirect costs, including delay costs, 
are hard to quantify and variable by nature, two characteristics that make them 
intimidating for stakeholders.  Additionally, the benefits of a terrorism prevention 
program are difficult to realize and hard to quantify. Therefore, weighing the benefits of 
100% scanning against the cost of a terrorist attack is challenging. 
 
• Logistical difficulties.  Our analysis indicated that foreign ports are the best location to 
perform scanning, primarily because scanning at foreign ports extends the border around 
the U.S.  However, scanning at foreign ports relies on sovereign nations complying with 
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our requests to scan containers and demands that cargo be secured in transit to avoid 
tampering with cargo.  Although containers can efficiently be scanned at port entry, it is 
impossible to view every scan because it would simply require too much land to 
physically inspect 5% of all containers (due to the false positive rate of current 
technology).  Risk-based targeting could be used to reduce the number of scans viewed 
(and thereby reduce the number of physical inspections) although difficulties with 
manifest authenticity and poor risk algorithms challenge effective risk assessment and 
resources allocation. 
 
• Stakeholder support.  Stakeholder alignment surrounding the issue of 100% scanning is 
somewhat fractured as each stakeholder is primarily interested in their own interests and 
has shown little desire to cooperate and compromise with other stakeholders.  Perhaps the 
most divisive issue is whether there is a security-efficiency tradeoff when it comes to 
cargo scanning.  Stakeholders are concerned about port throughput, the supply chain, and 
homeland security.  There are additional concerns regarding privacy, cost of the program 
and whether it is shared equitably, creation of jobs for various agencies and unions, and 
worker safety.   
 
Although these barriers are significant, we do not feel that they are insurmountable.  We feel that 
cargo security can and should be improved.  We believe the barriers can be overcome by 
implementing the following recommendations: 
 
1. Study the effect of 100% scanning as a deterrent to terrorist attacks.  Currently, there 
is little quantitative information publicly available that characterizes the risk of a cargo 
container attack being attempted.  Without a better understanding of this risk, it is both 
hard to understand the need for 100% scanning and impossible to measure whether a 
program is deterring threats.  It is difficult to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of a 
100% scanning policy because it is a preventative safety measure.  If the program does 
not disrupt the U.S. economy and an attack never occurs, then one can argue that the 
policy is successful.  However, the same end result might have occurred had scanning 
remained at 5%.  How can we tell whether the program is decreasing the risk of attack or 
not?  A study investigating how scanning policies actually thwart and decrease the risk of 
attack would help to measure the success of a 100% scanning program and improve the 
chance of the program’s adoption. 
 
Understanding the risk reduction offered by 100% scanning would help justify the 
program in the face of other security initiatives clamoring for support.  The significant 
resources necessary for successful 100% cargo scanning are more than just a dollar 
figure.  They also represent the opportunity cost of not allocating those same resources to 
other programs.  Politicians want to be assured that resources are devoted to programs 
that benefit from support.  As we better understand risks and risk reductions, the costs 
and benefits of 100% scanning become more apparent and measurable.   
 
2. 100% scanning should be conducted at foreign ports. Foreign scanning extends the 
borders so that a terrorist attack is detected and thwarted before ever reaching U.S soil.  
We assert that scanning at foreign ports is the only practical and acceptable location for 
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conducting all scans.  Because scanning at foreign ports leads to specific challenges, we 
make the following sub-recommendations to bolster scanning at foreign ports:  
 
a. Scanning at foreign ports should be overseen by U.S. officials who monitor 
compliance with U.S. scanning standards.  This is necessary so that scanning 
adheres to performance standards and if properly conducted.  U.S. oversight will 
inspire confidence in scan veracity.  
 
b. Promote development of anti-tamper devices.  This is necessary to ensure that 
containers are not tampered with en route to the U.S.  Any tampering would alert the 
Coast Guard and the ship would be prevented from entering U.S. waters until the 
tampered container is inspected.  
 
c. Containers that are not scanned at foreign ports should not be loaded on ships.  
As host governments are sovereign, they may refuse to conduct cargo scans to U.S. 
specifications, or refuse to scan at all. In this case, the unscanned cargo (or under-
scanned cargo) should remain at foreign ports and not be allowed entry into U.S. 
ports.  
 
3. Couple radiation detection with imaging for 100% scanning.  Focus R&D on 
reducing false positive rates and improving chemical detection technology. Radiation 
detection and imaging technology each have inherent weaknesses which are mitigated by 
employing a combination of the technologies.  A radioactive sample shielded with a few 
inches of lead can go unnoticed by a radiation portal.  The dense lead, however, is 
certainly to be imaged by radiographic imaging, thus alerting the scanning operator to the 
presence of something suspicious.   
 
We recommend that the U.S. increase funding to the private sector and government 
laboratories to expedite the improvement of existing technologies and the development of 
non-intrusive, rapid chemical detection technology.     
 
4. Coordinate stakeholders with strong executive backing and propose unambiguous 
legislation to Congress stipulating 100% scanning. Stakeholders must understand that 
cargo scanning is both a matter of national security and a means of enhancing supply 
chain integrity.  Such coordination needs to come from a powerful executive position 
within the government that will help drive the program and rally stakeholders around it.  
At the same time, legislations should be proposed that clearly states implementation 
details as outlined in Recommendations 2, 3, and 5.  Proposed legislation should clearly 
designate timelines for compliance. 
 
5. View and interpret only 5% of stored scans based on 100% risk screening. It is 
logistically impractical to physically inspect much more than the current rate of 0.25% 
because of land constraints.  For this reason it is necessary to view only 5% of scanned 
cargo.  The remaining 95% of scans should be electronically stored to be used as a 
forensic tool in the event that a threat is detected downstream so that the vulnerability can 
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be identified and secured.  Risk targeting algorithms should be used to guide the selection 
of which scans to view, although the current algorithm needs to be improved. 
 
6. Emphasize resiliency as the primary goal of 100% scanning. Emphasizing resiliency 
will help allay concerns about recommendation 5, which appears somewhat 
counterintuitive and seems to defeat the goal of detection.  Designing the supply chain to 
be resilient will likely limit government overreaction if an attack either occurred or a 
threat was detected.  In the airplane industry, the black box, which logs the causes of 
malfunction in crashes, is an invaluable tool for many reasons, including identifying 
crash causes and restoring confidence in air travel post-crash.  Similarly, a database of 
scanned cargo containers could be used in the wake of s domestic port attack to 
investigate the source of the attack and make sure that all other U.S.-bound cargo do not 
pose a threat.   
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Appendix B: Supplemental Discussion of Technology 
Active Radiation Detection 
The neutron detector was developed by private industry in the 1990’s in response to the U.S. 
Government’s concern that threats without definitive shapes were passing security tests.  
Neutron detectors stimulate signals specific to a given material by aiming neutron beams at the 
object and detecting returns on the opposite side of the container.  The returns are compared to a 
database of threat signatures. These signatures are based upon element composition and are 
examined by computer. In the event of a match, the computer program alerts the human 
operators for further inspection.  The autonomous neutron scanner removes humans from 
legitimate cargo scans and allows them to focus on identifying and inspecting potential threats. 
Active radiation detection systems tend to be more expensive however they have been used in 
some cases.  
Backscatter X-Ray Imaging 
There is another method of radiographic imaging, termed backscatter x-rays (it is not currently 
available with gamma-rays) where the beam of radiation is scattered back towards the source, an 
effect known as the ‘Compton effect’ (Figure 18).  Backscatter x-rays are designed to image low 
atomic number elements, which tend to have a larger Compton Effect than more massive 
elements.  Thus, backscatter x-rays are able to image organic compounds, drugs, human 
stowaways, and even some chemical explosives that contain organic compounds.  (Figure 19) 
 
 
Figure 18: Transmission and backscatter x-rays60 
                                                 
60 American Science and Engineering, inc. (2006), www.as-e.com 
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Figure 19: Transmission x-rays image different materials than backscatter x-rays61 
 
Further Discussion of Active Radiation Detection 
Mobile variants of the fixed-site systems are also being developed.  Increasingly common among 
Mobile GaRDS (gamma ray radiography) systems are compact radiological threat identification 
systems (RTIS).  These systems allow positive isotopic identification of radiological dispersal 
devices (RDDs) and neutrons from fissionable materials that may be concealed in containers.  It 
should be noted, however, that neutron beam systems also fall prey to legitimate materials that 
radiate naturally, but their spectral signatures can be compared to databases by computer 
software and allowed to pass without further inspection. 
 
Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (PFNA) fixed-site systems are currently being installed at the 
U.S.-Mexican border as a joint U.S. DOD-TSA-CBP project.  PFNA neutron scanners have a 
stated throughput of approximately 10-20 trucks/hour, but have a high cost of $10 million per 
copy.  While the neutron technology has been fielded in a few ports around the world, the 
prospects for mass implementation remain unfavorable. 
Chemical Detection Technologies 
The most commonly deployed chemical inspection system is residue trace detection.  These 
systems analyze the chemical composition of sample residue wiped from suspect articles or 
attained off of a subject’s person.  Machines compare the chemical composition of these samples 
to the signature of known explosive materials and alarm the operator if a match is probable.  
New trace detection systems such as HWPR’s Air Jet Explosive Detector (AJETD) have 
potential for large-scale chemical screening because of their ability to screen large areas by 
blowing molecules of surrounding air into a detector which uses gas chromatography to partition 
chemical substances in a mixture. 
 
In the U.S. and Australia, Customs agencies have begun to train Chemical Detector Dogs to 
detect vapor signatures customary of chemical weapons.  They are also trained to alert their 
handlers in passive ways so as to not attract the attention of potential suspects.  While canine 
programs have proven successful in the detection of narcotics, currency and explosives, full-
scale deployment of canine teams for container security is not efficient given the highly-intrusive 
(and thus time-consuming) nature of canine inspections. 
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BARRIERS TO THE SUCCESS OF 100% MARITIME CARGO CONTAINER SCANNING 
 56
Engineers at the U.S. Department of Energy's Argonne National Laboratory have developed a set 
of NII sensors that can quickly and accurately detect chemical, biological, nuclear and explosive 
materials.  The so-called “T-ray” sensors use a spectroscopic technique to remotely detect the 
spectra of chemicals and explosives spectra.  The new technique detects spectral characteristics 
that uniquely identify elements contained in explosives and lethal chemicals. T-rays can 
provided unambiguous identification of explosive chemicals, including TNT and plastic 
explosives, that previous electromagnetic radiation and mass spectrometry techniques are unable 
to do.  Engineers at Argonne claim that the T-ray method is “highly specific” and that it 
“eliminates interference from confounding elements.”62  The technology is continuing testing by 
Argonne, and barring any major setbacks, is a strong candidate for future remote cargo scanning. 
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